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Trieste Question 25X1A

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**SUPPLEMENT TO  
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1. "Even if it may sound unpatriotic - and it certainly is not - I have to tell you how much I admire the recent step taken in the Trieste question, its firmness, its exact timing, and the effect which it is bound to produce not only in Italy but also in my country both as a hit to the regime and as a help to the nation. It is a master stroke.
2. "The regime must be stunned by the blow. It made the Trieste question the chief aim of its foreign policy, concentrating on this issue all its efforts on the Peace Conference; it created a special propaganda machinery for this purpose; it printed innumerable books, staged mass manifestations, political conferences; it allotted radiotime, and in the period 1945 - 1946 the newspapers were dominated by this question. The regime staked its honor, it overexerted itself in this question to a degree which was regarded by the nation more than foolish, and the result after all this grand words, immense efforts, and gestures ('We will give our lives but not Trieste' and similar ..) is, that everything what the regime did committing itself so much, is rendered zero just because the US Government decided otherwise.
3. "I wish I could be able to describe the extent of the defeat the Yugoslav regime experienced in this issue. The step in the Trieste question has rendered the power and influence of the US Government as something which is very near and cannot be ignored, and it has also proved to the nation that the propaganda of the regime, that the US Government is something remote, negligible, something which the regime can attack and slight without fear, is false; and that the boasting of the regime is one proof more, that they will lead the country into still greater disaster.
4. "As to the nation, it must be understood that ever since the regime proclaimed the Trieste question the main aim of its foreign policy, the nation - in spite of the impression which might have been created by the manifestations (every office, factory, institution etc had to appear rank and file like school children, the slogans distributed by the party members on small slips to be shouted etc) - the nation regarded the whole Trieste business as a concern of the Communist Party and in consequence of hoped that 'they' will not get it.

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5. "I am not asserting that there does not exist in the nation a feeling that Trieste should belong to Yugoslavia. Such feeling is especially strong in Slovenia, but this feeling under the present circumstances had to give way to the feeling that this regime should not claim a victory in its professed main international aim. So be assured that at present - as long as this regime is in power - the nation will gladly accept the handing over of Trieste to Italy, regarding it necessary for the achievement of a greater and common cause of democracy.
6. "Also, the nation is of the opinion that it is just because of the regime that Trieste was not given to the nation in the course of the Peace Conference, and I am sure that the nation will be of the same opinion now. Still, it was very wise that in the joint statement it was stated that because of the failure of the regime to live up to its obligation in administering its area of the FTT, this area has to be handed over to Italy. So it is an action against the regime and not against the nation.
7. "So the regime found itself in a very ridiculous position; whatever they do they cannot prevent the defeat in this issue. How the people will rejoice. (In connection with this I would like to point out the rather keen sense of humor of my countrymen and draw attention to the possibilities which do present themselves here - the amusement felt by the people could be heightened to open ridicule, the Government providing the laughing-stock.
8. "The step will instill new confidence and new strength to the people in my country, the authority of the regime will be badly shaken - one stroke of the US Government sufficed to upset the two years long tremendous efforts of the regime; a single stroke rendered all the deluge of printed paper and millions of words of the Communist leaders - Tito included - to insignificance, to nothing. The remote, slighted, negligible United States made its effective entrance.
9. "The action will also give something to think about to those intellectuals who have joined the Communist Party after the war, and it will certainly have a most healthy influence with those who, believing that the present regime is a lasting and a stable one, have become (or pretended to become) supporters of the regime, taking part in all activities favored by the regime, joining the National Front etc. All such, who pretended to be the fervent supporters of the regime either in the wish to be on the right hand wagon, or to accommodate themselves to circumstances which would and could not be altered, or out of fear, all such will be aware now that they will have to reckon with a new factor, that in all probability they will have to account for their activities in the future, and in addition, the facts remain that in the most cases such people themselves do not approve of their own actions.
10. "Now these people will realize that the step taken in Trieste has to be viewed in the light of the new policy of the US Government to stop further aggression of Communism, that this policy is determined, firm, and backed by unlimited sources of power, that the action is a beginning and indication of others which will follow in due time, and above all, the people will realize that this policy is the only one which can liberate them from their present plight. I am positive that in all such the desire to do something, to show their own conviction and belief in democracy and freedom, will be ardent.
11. "They are without doubt a great potential force in the fight for peace and democracy, and there is no doubt that they should be mobilized. But how? Around whom could they rally? What could they do?
12. "Even if it is my own nation I cannot pretend that it consists of heroes only. Then there are the bondages and necessities everyday life brings with itself, and there is the almost perfect police machinery. The people, unorganized and acting as such against a superorganized minority, is bound to bring only disaster to itself, yet, without any doubt the people would like to act. Moreover, it could act as an entity and each member to its own ability, remaining for the beginning in their presently occupied positions, pursuing its activities as they do now but that being only the surface of things, and in reality organizing into small cells, with a very probable safety, performing for the beginning only small tasks, discussing the situation in cells, preparing for future actions, each cell determining its own possibilities, forming a vast organization which at the start would be linked together only by instructions received from one source accessible to all, training them in discipline which would be self-imposed - what a luxury and temptation after the coercion in a police state - and preparing the ground when they could be summoned to fight for peace. The very existing of such a force would be a check for the government, a force which cannot be arrested because being elusive.

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because it comprises 95% of the nation, a force which penetrates and infiltrates every aspect of the party-controlled machine. A force which, like a ghost, would haunt the paranoically disposed party.

13. "I again return to the desirability of an ungovernmental information service which would not be hampered by considerations a governmental service necessarily is.
14. "It is my firm opinion that one of the greatest forces for the preservation of peace is in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The force consists in the peoples themselves, who if aided, could check their aggressive governments. Unlimited information could help it a lot.
15. "After the Trieste action, the offensive in international field is in the hands of the democratic countries, yet on the internal field the western democracies are still on the defensive. What about a change, and put the aggressors in the defensive in this field also? Do you think that that would make them more susceptible to reason on other fields? Or that that could help to preserve peace? Do you not think that the task would be a relatively easy one?"

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